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Abstract 
There is an enormous literature on gender gaps in pay and labour market participation but virtually no 
literature on gender gaps in unemployment rates.  Although there are some countries in which there is 
essentially no gender gap in unemployment, there are others in which the female unemployment rate is 
substantially above the male.  Although it is easy to give plausible reasons for why more women than men 
may decide not to want work, it is not so obvious why, once they have decided they want a job, women in 
some countries are less likely to be in employment than men.  This is the subject of this paper.  We show 
that, in countries where there is a large gender gap in unemployment rates, there is a gender gap in both 
flows from employment into unemployment and from unemployment into employment. We investigate 
different hypotheses about the sources of these gaps. Most hypotheses find little support in the data and the 
gender gap in unemployment rates (like the gender gap in pay) remains largely unexplained.  But it does 
seem to correlate with attitudes on whether men are more deserving of work than women so that 
discrimination against women may explain part of the gender gap in unemployment rates in the 
Mediterranean countries. 
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Introduction 
There is an enormous literature on gender gaps in pay and a vast literature on gender 
gaps in labour force participation rates (see Altonji and Blank, 1999, for an overall 
survey and Blau and Kahn, 2003, for a recent international comparison).  Yet, there is 
very little written on gender gaps in unemployment rates (though see Ham, Svejnar 
and Terrell, 1999, for an examination of two transition countries): for example a 
recent OECD paper on the economic position of women baldly stated on the first page 
that “the analysis concentrates on gender differences in employment, the organisation 
and characteristics of jobs and their remuneration, leaving aside the examination of 
unemployment or inactivity” (OECD, 2002, p63).  If there were no interesting gender 
gaps in unemployment rates then this lack of literature might be understandable.  But, 
as Table 1 shows, this is not the case: while the gender gap in unemployment rates 
(measured as the female minus the male) is small (or even negative) in some 
countries, there are others in which it is very large.  For example in the UK, the 
prime-age female unemployment rate is 1.1 percentage points below the male while in 
Spain it is 11.8 percentage points above.  It should be emphasized that the 
unemployment rates in Table 1 are all computed using the standardized ILO 
definition1 so are meant to be comparable across countries.  In terms of the gender gap 
in unemployment rates, one can identify several distinct groups of countries in Table 
1.  First, the highest gender gaps in unemployment rates are to be found in the 
Mediterranean countries (Spain, Greece, Italy and France).  Next come the Benelux 
countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg), then the ‘Germanic’ countries 
(Germany, Austria and Switzerland), then the ‘Nordic’ countries (Sweden, Finland 
and Norway) and, finally the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ (US, UK, Ireland, Australia, Canada and 
                                                 
1 To be unemployed according to the ILO definition, one must not be currently in employment, one 
must have looked for work in the last 4 weeks and be available to start work within 2 weeks. 
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New Zealand).  In a number of the Mediterranean countries the ‘unemployment 
problem’ is largely a problem of female unemployment2.  For future use we will refer 
to the countries in which the female unemployment rate is much higher than the male 
as the ‘high-gap’ countries and those in which the female-male gap in unemployment 
rates is small or even negative as the ‘low-gap’ countries.   
 One might wonder whether the pattern of gender gaps in unemployment rates 
across countries has always been as Table 1 shows it is now.  Figure 1 looks at the 
evolution of male and female unemployment rates over time.  One can see that there 
is an interesting reversal.  Most of the countries that now have large gaps used to have 
small or non-existent gaps and the gap only emerged in the 1960s and 1970s whereas 
some countries like the US used to have a gender gap but now do not (although it was 
always much smaller than seen in some countries today).  
This paper starts from the premise that this gender gap in unemployment rates 
is interesting and attempts to understand why this gap exists and how the cross-
country variation can be explained.  One should emphasize that the question we are 
interested in answering is not ‘why are women less likely to be in employment than 
men?’ (either measured as the employment-population ratio or the labour force 
participation rate) for which there are fairly obvious answers in terms of the allocation 
of domestic responsibilities and a large literature on the subject but the question ‘why, 
once they have decided they want a job, are women in some countries much less 
likely to be in employment than men?’3. 
 
                                                 
2 Typically these countries also have very high youth unemployment rates though we do not consider 
this issue here. 
3 Of course, it may not be so easy to separate participation from unemployment decisions and the 
possible links between the two are discussed below. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we consider the 
gender gap in unemployment rates in more detail, investigating whether the aggregate 
figures (as presented in Table 1 and Figure 1) can be explained by gender gaps in 
characteristics among those in the labour force.  The answer, probably unsurprisingly, 
is ‘no’.  This section also investigates variation in the gender gap in unemployment 
rates across different characteristics: we find that the gender gap in unemployment 
rates tends to be larger for the young, married women and those with young children.  
 The second section then looks at gender differences in labour market 
dynamics, the flows into and out of employment, unemployment and inactivity.  
Women tend to have higher flows out of employment into unemployment in the 
‘high-gap’ countries and higher flows into inactivity in all countries.  But, the ‘high-
gap’ countries also tend to have large gender differentials in the flow out of 
unemployment into employment.  We need to understand both why employed women 
in some countries leave employment for unemployment at a faster rate than men and 
why unemployed women in some countries find it so much more difficult than men to 
get a job. 
 The third section investigates in more detail flows out of employment into 
unemployment.  We show that, in most countries, one cannot explain much of the 
gender gap in these flows using gender differences in the types of jobs that men and 
women do.  We also show that domestic responsibilities (primarily child care) only 
account for a small fraction of job endings that result in unemployment (most job 
endings for these reasons end up in inactivity) so that it is not primarily gender 
differences in domestic responsibilities that can account for the gender differences in 
the flows from employment to unemployment. 
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 The fourth section investigates the flow from unemployment to employment.  
We find no evidence that the female unemployed are less ‘serious’ about wanting 
work than their male counterparts in the ‘high-gap’ countries.  The gender gap in 
reported search activity seems similar in both ‘high-gap’ and ‘low-gap’ countries and 
and the receipt of welfare benefits by women in ‘high-gap’ countries is typically quite 
low. 
 The fifth section considers the hypothesis that it is the behaviour of employers 
that makes it difficult for unemployed women to get jobs in some countries.  We 
present evidence that in countries where attitudes are more gender biased the gender 
gap in unemployment rates is higher.  We suggest that, when the overall 
unemployment rate is high and there are queues for most jobs, it is relatively easy for 
employers to indulge in discriminatory behaviour.  
 The sixth section investigates the hypothesis that, in some countries, there is a 
mismatch between the types of jobs that unemployed women want and employers are 
offering.  Perhaps the most notable possible example is the availability of part-time 
work.  It is true that there is a lot of variation in the extent of part-time employment 
and that it tends to be relatively rare in the ‘Mediterranean’ countries which have 
large gender gaps in unemployment rates.  But, the unemployed women in these 
countries do not report that they are looking for part-time jobs and it seems likely that 
the lack of availability of part-time work can explain low female participation rates in 
some countries but not their high unemployment rates. 
 Our conclusion is that it is easier to provide evidence against certain 
hypotheses about the source of gender gaps in unemployment rates than it is to 
provide evidence for hypotheses.  In this there is perhaps a parallel to the gender pay 
gap that is also hard to fully explain.  However, we do suggest that attitudes towards 
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male and female unemployment may be important in explaining the gap in countries 
where unemployment is high.  
    
1. Variations in the gender gap in unemployment rates 
 It is conceivable that the gender gaps in unemployment rates observed in 
Table 1 can be explained away by gender gaps in characteristics that vary across 
countries.  Some descriptive statistics of men and women in the labour force are 
presented in Table A1 in the Data Appendix.  For the European countries, we use data 
from the first six waves of the European Community Household Panel Survey 
(ECHPS) that cover the period 1994-19994 and, for the United States, we use data 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1996-2000 (to have an approximately 
comparable period). 
 Table A1 contains a lot of information but the following seem the most 
noteworthy features.  There are some features that seem true of most countries: 
unemployed women tend to be younger than unemployed men, and a higher fraction 
of women (both in employment and unemployment) are divorced or separated.  But 
there are some features of the raw data that differ across countries.  For example in 
Spain, Greece, Ireland, and Italy women (both employed and unemployed) tend to 
have higher education levels than their male counterparts and lower levels of work 
experience, while France, Belgium, UK, US and the Netherlands do not have marked 
gender gaps in these variables.  This pattern fits with differences in the labour force 
participation rates and suggests a stronger relationship between education and labour 
market participation in countries with a low overall female participation rate. 
                                                 
4 For details of the ECHPS see Peracchi (2002) and Nicoletti and Peracchi (2002) who discuss, among 
other things, sample attrition.  Because there may be concerns about the representativeness of the 
ECHPS we have checked the results for the UK and Spain using their respective Labour Force 
Surveys: these results are very similar and are available on request from the authors.   
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Regarding the number of children, there are, crudely, three groups of 
countries. In Spain, Greece, Italy, France, Luxemburg, and Ireland, there are no 
differences between unemployed men and women, but there are more employed 
women that have either no children or young children. In Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Sweden there are no differences among the employed workers but there are 
more unemployed females that have young children.  Finally, in the UK, US, Portugal 
and Finland there are no significant differences between males and females in these 
variables. 
 To investigate the hypothesis that differences in characteristics can explain 
gender gaps in unemployment rates we estimate probit models for the probability of 
being unemployed (conditional on being in the labour force so that we are looking at 
unemployment rates) including a variety of characteristics as well as a female 
dummy.  The other characteristics included are dummies for age, education, marital 
status, and the presence of kids in the household.  The results are reported in Table 2 
where countries are ordered by the gender gap in unemployment rates among prime-
age workers as reported in Table 1 (we also follow this practice in all subsequent 
Tables).  The first column reports the marginal effects when only a female dummy is 
included i.e. we estimate a model of the form: 
 ( ) ( )0 1Pr 1U femaleβ β= = Φ +  (1) 
These marginal effects should be comparable to the gender gaps in aggregate 
unemployment rates presented in Table 1.  They are similar though not identical, the 
reason being that the data come from different sources and refer to different periods.  
The second column then reports the marginal effect of the female dummy when the 
other characteristics are included in the model (their coefficients are not reported to 
save space) i.e. we estimate a model of the form:  
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 ( ) ( )0 1 2Pr 1U female xβ β β= = Φ + +  (2) 
where x is the vector of other characteristics.  Although there is a very slight tendency 
for the gender gap in unemployment rates to fall in the ‘Mediterranean’ countries the 
amount of the gender gap that can be explained using these characteristics is small 
and substantial gender gaps in unemployment remain in the countries where they exist 
in the aggregate data. 
 The model estimated so far assumes that all women, whatever their other 
characteristics, have a higher chance of being unemployed.  But, it may be the case 
that the gender gap varies with characteristics.  So, we then estimate a model in which 
all the characteristics are interacted with a female dummy i.e. a model of the form: 
 ( ) ( )0 1 2 3Pr 1 *U female x female xβ β β β= = Φ + + +  (3) 
The marginal effects of these interactions are reported in the third through twelfth 
column of Table 2.  Because the probit model is non-linear one cannot exactly read 
off the gender gaps in unemployment rates for different sorts of workers from this part 
of Table 2 but, to a first approximation, one can work out the gap in unemployment 
rates between men and women with a given set of characteristics, x, by adding the 
coefficients that apply to them.  So, to work out the gender gap for married people 
with young children one would add the marginal effects for having young children 
and being female, the marginal effect for being married and female and the marginal 
effect for being female.  There is obviously a lot of information here so the results are 
hard to digest.  But, the coefficient on the female dummy itself remains large and 
significant in the ‘high-gap’ countries and, where the interaction terms are significant, 
it seems to be that it is among the young, the married and those with young children 
that the gender gaps in unemployment rates are largest.  
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 All of the discussion so far has been about whether differences in observed 
characteristics can explain the gender gap in unemployment rates.  But, it is possible 
that differences in unobserved characteristics might also be important, especially in 
countries where the female participation rate is low and selection into the labour force 
by women is an important question.  But, it seems plausible to think that these 
unobservable characteristics related to labour market participation would actually 
exacerbate the gender gap in unemployment rates, not explain them away.  To 
illustrate this suppose that individuals differ in their ‘employability’, denoted by x, 
and that the unemployment rate is a negative function of x (denote it by u(x)).  
Further, assume that, in the population, x is equally distributed across men and women 
so that the ‘true’ gender gap in unemployment rates is zero.  If all men participate in 
the labour market then we will have pm(x)=1 where pm(x) is the labour force 
participation rate for a man with characteristics x5.  For women in countries where 
female labour force participation is low (e.g. Spain), we have pf (x)<1 and it seems 
likely that pf’(x)>0 so there is a positive relationship between ‘employability’ and 
labour market participation (we saw evidence of this earlier in the fact that Spanish 
women in the labour force are better educated than men).  In this example we would 
observe the female unemployment rate to be below that of the male simply because 
the women in the labour force are more positively selected than the men in terms of 
their employability.  This means we would tend to underestimate the true gender gap 
in the unemployment rate that, in this example, is zero. 
 This section has shown that the raw gender gaps in unemployment rates 
cannot be explained away by gender gaps in characteristics and that, in ‘high-gap’ 
countries, even women without the burdens of a partner or children are more likely to 
                                                 
5 The conclusion will also go through if we assume that male participation rates are a function of x as 
long as the sensitivity to x is weaker than for women. 
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be unemployed than equivalent men (though having a partner and/or children worsens 
this disadvantage). 
 A natural next question is whether the gender gap in unemployment rates that 
we observe in some countries is the result of gender differences in flows into 
unemployment or flows out of unemployment: this is the subject of the next section. 
 
2. Gender gaps in Labour Market Dynamics 
 Most labour economists are familiar with the following formula for the steady-
state unemployment rate:  
 eu
eu ue
hu
h h
= +  (4) 
where euh is the rate at which workers leave employment for unemployment and ueh  is 
the rate at which they leave unemployment for employment.  But, the formula in (4) is 
based on the assumption that an individual can only be either employed or 
unemployed.  Given the importance of inactivity for women (and increasingly for 
men in many countries) using this formula to understand gender differences in 
unemployment rates might be thought to be a bit limiting.  If one introduces the extra 
state of inactivity then one can show that the steady-state unemployment rate (note – 
not the unemployment-population ratio) can be written as:  
( / )(1 )
( / ) ( / )
eu ei ui
eu ue ei ui ie iu
h h hu
h h h h h h
α α= − ++ +                                           (5) 
where:  
( ) ( )ie ui iu eiie ui eu ue iu ei eu ue
h h h h
h h h h h h h h
α += + + + + +                                           (6) 
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The interpretation of (5) is the following.  It says that the overall unemployment rate 
can be thought of as a weighted average of two ‘component’ unemployment rates.  
The first term on the right-hand side of (5) is the unemployment rate if there were 
never any flows into or out of inactivity (it is simply the formula in (4)).  The second 
term on the right-hand side of (5) is what the unemployment rate would be if there 
were never any direct flows between employment and unemployment only indirect 
flows via inactivity.  Note that, for this unemployment rate, it is the relative size of 
flows from employment/unemployment to inactivity and vice versa that is important.  
So, if workers flow at a faster rate from employment to inactivity than from 
unemployment to inactivity this will tend to raise the unemployment rate.   
So, one of the terms in (5) assumes inactivity is unimportant in determining 
the unemployment rate and the other that it is very important.  The weight α  is then a 
measure of the relative importance of flows via inactivity in generating 
unemployment though it is hard to give an intuition for its exact functional form. 
If there are gender differences in unemployment rates this must be because of 
gender differences in some (or all) of the hazard rates in (5).  Which differences are 
most important is likely to be helpful in understanding gender differences in 
unemployment rates.  We now consider this issue.   
 Table 3a presents estimates of the hazard rates and computation of the 
different components in (5) for men and Table 3b the corresponding information for 
women.  The data we use for this comes from the retrospective monthly employment 
history that all individuals in the ECHPS are asked to complete and from consecutive 
monthly CPS files matching those individuals who are in the sample in consecutive 
months.  Our method for estimating the labour market transition rates is the following.  
We have observations on the labour market state an individual is in one month 
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(denote this by 0S  that can take the values e,u,i) and then again a month later (denote 
this by tS ).  As the interval between the two observations is a month it is a reasonable 
approximation to assume that individuals cannot make two transitions in that period.  
Then the simplest way to estimate a hazard rate ( euh say) is to note that: 
 ( )0Pr , euh tt tS e S e S i e−= = ≠ =  (7) 
The left-hand side of (7) is readily computed using our data and we take the negative 
of the log to compute the hazard rate6.  The hazard rates in Table 3 are multiplied by 
100 so can be interpreted as the percentage of individuals in one labour market state 
moving to another in the course of a month. 
 One noticeable feature of this data is that flows between different labour 
market states are much higher in the US than in the European countries.  While this is 
probably true, there are reasons for thinking that the gap as it appears in Table 3 is 
larger than in reality as the European data comes from retrospective information that 
probably tends to ‘forget’ transitions and the US data is known to have 
misclassification problems (see Abowd and Zellner, 1983, or Abraham and Shimer, 
2002) that tend to over-state transitions.  However, the main interest here is not the 
comparison across countries but the gender gaps within countries so we do not 
attempt to correct the data in any way. 
As well as the hazard rates, Tables 3a and 3b also reports the three 
components of the steady-state unemployment rate as presented in (5) – the steady-
state unemployment rate one would calculate ignoring inactivity (the eighth column), 
that one would calculate ignoring direct flows between employment and 
unemployment (the ninth column), and the ‘share’ of the two components using the 
                                                 
6 When the interval between observations is small the estimated hazard rate will be very similar to a 
simple-minded estimate of the probability of moving states.  For example heu as defined in (7) is the 
probability of moving from employment to unemployment given there is not a move to inactivity. 
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formula in (5) and (6) (the tenth column) .  Finally, the penultimate column presents 
the steady-state unemployment rate computed using the hazard rates and the final 
column the actual unemployment rate in the data as a check on the internal 
consistency.  The last two columns are similar, differences arising from the fact that 
the labour markets are not in a steady state. 
 Looking at the results for men in Table 3a one can see that the ‘α’ is small, 
implying that flows into and out of inactivity are relatively unimportant in explaining 
the male unemployment rate.  Also, the two component unemployment rates are very 
similar.  So, the bottom line is that the difference in the steady-state unemployment 
rates computed using the formulae in (4) and (5) are very small and that, to a first 
approximation, one can ignore inactivity.  Given the high labour force participation 
rates for men this is probably not that surprising. 
 What might be found more surprising are the results for women in Table 3b.  It 
is true that ‘α’ is larger for women than for men, implying a more important role for 
inactivity but, in many countries, it is still very low.  This is quite consistent with a 
low female participation rate if inactivity is a very stable state.  And, again the two 
component unemployment rates tend to be quite similar with the conclusion that the 
use of (4) rather than (5) will not lead to seriously misleading conclusions. 
 Given the results in Tables 3a and 3b we will, in the interests of keeping the 
paper to a manageable length, concentrate in the rest of this paper on gender gaps in 
flows between employment and unemployment and largely ignore gender differences 
in flows involving inactivity.  One must be careful here: the results in Tables 3a and 
3b do not suggest that gender gaps in flows involving inactivity are non-existent, it is 
simply that they (for some reason) mirror gender gaps in flows that do not involve 
inactivity.  This needs to be borne in mind.   
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 We now estimate the hazard rates including other relevant controls.  As the 
hazard rates must be non-negative a convenient empirical model is: 
 eu xeuh e
β=  (8) 
where x is a vector of characteristics (that will include female dummies).  Substituting 
(8) into (7) suggests that a simple way to estimate euβ  is to restrict the sample to those 
who are initially in employment and not subsequently in inactivity and then use a 
complementary log-log model to estimate the probability that the individual is in 
employment.  A similar methodology can be used to estimate all the other hazard 
rates.  The coefficients on a female dummy are reported in Table 4a without any other 
controls) and in Table 4b with controls for personal characteristics7.  
  Note that the coefficient estimates will be the extent to which the hazard rate for 
a particular labour market transition is proportionately different for women.  So, when 
we see in the column headed euh  that the coefficient on the female dummy for 
Germany is 0.067 this means that women are 6.7% more likely to leave employment 
for unemployment than men8.   
 There is a lot of information in Tables 4a and 4b but the most important points 
are the following.  If we consider direct flows between employment and 
unemployment, the ‘high-gap’ countries seem to have large gender gaps in both the 
                                                 
7 Because we want a common specification for all the hazard rates, the controls do not include any 
variables that are ‘state-specific’ e.g. characteristics of a job if one is in employment.  But, Tables 6 
and 12 do provide information on the importance of these characteristics. 
8 One might wonder whether proportionate or absolute differences in hazard rates are the more 
important: we think proportionate differences for the following reason.  To keep things simple, 
consider the formula for the steady-state unemployment rate in (4). Then simple, differentiation shows 
that: 
 (1 )
ln( ) ln( )eu ue
u uu u
h h
∂ ∂= − = −∂ ∂   
so that a proportionate change in euh  will have the same impact on unemployment (though with the 
opposite sign) as an equal proportionate change in ueh .  This means that we can, more or less, compare 
the coefficients on the female dummy for different transition rates. 
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flows from employment to unemployment and the flows from unemployment to 
employment than ‘low-gap’ countries (read down a column to see this).  Both of these 
gender gaps need to be understood to get a good understanding of the source the 
gender gap in unemployment rates.  One might be concerned about the robustness of 
this conclusion but other data support it.  If women find it harder than men to leave 
unemployment in some countries then we would expect their durations of 
unemployment to be higher on average.  This is what we see in Table 5.    
  If we consider flows involving inactivity, women in all countries tend to have 
higher flows into inactivity both from employment and unemployment.  But, as the 
discussion of (5) above made clear, it is the proportional difference in the hazard rates 
from employment and unemployment to inactivity that is important for the 
unemployment rate so that one should look at the difference between the female 
dummy on the EI transition and the UI transition in Table 4a or 4b.  In the ‘high-gap’ 
countries there is some indication that the gender gap in the flow from employment to 
inactivity is larger than the gender gap in the flow from unemployment to inactivity: 
this will tend to increase the unemployment rate.  There is a less systematic pattern in 
the gender gap in flows from inactivity to employment or unemployment.  
 Given the evidence in Tables 4a and 4b we focus first on the flows from 
employment to unemployment, then on the flows from unemployment to 
employment.  
 
3. Gender Differences in Flows from Employment to Unemployment 
As Table 4 has shown, women in the ‘high-gap’ countries leave employment for 
unemployment at a higher rate than do men.  The flow from employment to 
unemployment is investigated further in Table 6.  These regressions are similar to 
 15
those we estimated in Tables 4a and 4b except that, in some specifications, we include 
some characteristics of the job – notably, industry, occupation, the size of employer, 
the type of contract and whether the job is public sector to investigate whether gender 
gaps in these variables can help to explain gender gaps in flows from employment to 
unemployment9.  Also, because the information on the characteristics of the job held 
are only available for jobs held at the annual interview, these equations are estimated 
on annual data. 
 In the first column of Table 6 we report estimates of models for the transition 
from employment to unemployment that include only a female dummy.  The 
qualitative pattern of these coefficients that are based on annual data is the same as 
those in Table 4a (that were based on monthly data) with women having higher rates 
of transition from employment to unemployment than men in the ‘high-gap’ 
countries.  The second column then introduces personal characteristics as extra 
controls: this has only marginal effects on the coefficient on the female dummy.  The 
next four columns then report results when we interact the female dummy with 
marital status and the number of children to see whether there is significant variation 
in the gender gap in the flow from employment to unemployment.  Almost all of these 
interaction terms have coefficients that are insignificantly different from zero 
suggesting that domestic responsibilities do not play a big role in transitions from 
employment to unemployment.  This is not to say that domestic responsibilities do not 
play an important role in women’s flows out of employment, just that women with 
children are more likely to leave employment for inactivity than unemployment.  This 
conclusion is consistent with information on the reasons given for why jobs end.  
Table 7a tabulates the reasons given by the currently unemployed for why their 
                                                 
9 We did not do this in Tables 4a and 4b because we wanted to adopt a common specification for all the 
hazard rates so could only include covariates that are defined in all labour market states. 
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previous job ended and in Table 7b reasons are given by the currently inactive for 
why the previous job ended.  With the exception of a couple of countries, reasons 
connected with ‘caring’ account for a very small fraction of jobs ending where the 
individual is currently unemployed10.  This is not surprising: most women leaving 
employment to have children go directly into inactivity.    
 In many countries men are more likely than women to be laid-off.  In 
countries like the UK this difference is extreme – 45% of male jobs end because the 
worker is laid-off compared to 23% of women.  In the ‘high-gap’ countries, the most 
striking feature of Table 7a is that there does not seem to be a large gender gap in the 
reasons for why workers leave employment for unemployment in the ‘high-gap’ 
countries.  This hints that it may be employers who are choosing to end the contracts 
of married women with children rather than those women choosing to quit. 
The final column in Table 6 reports the coefficient on the female dummy 
when job characteristics (industry, occupation, public/private size of firm, full-/part-
time, permanent/temporary, job tenure) are also included in a model of the transitions 
from employment to unemployment.  Petrongolo (2003) has documented how female 
workers are over-represented in temporary and part-time jobs that are generally at 
more risk of ending.  In France and Spain (which are heavy users of temporary 
contracts) the introduction of these variables does significantly reduce the coefficient 
on the female dummy but the addition of these variables makes little difference to the 
gender gap in most countries. 
Now, let us turn to flows in the opposite direction, from unemployment to 
employment. 
 
                                                 
10 In fact, Table 7a probably overstates the proportion as women who had children and left employment 
for inactivity but are now trying to get a job again will be included in the ‘currently’ unemployed 
category. 
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4. Flows from Unemployment to Employment: The behaviour of workers 
The actions of both individuals and employers are likely to affect the flow from 
unemployment to employment.  In this section we consider the actions of the 
unemployed themselves and the following section considers the actions of employers. 
 The unemployment rate is meant to measure the fraction of people who want a 
job but do not have one.  The ILO definition of unemployment uses evidence that 
people have looked for work in the recent past and are available to start work in the 
near future to determine whether people without work currently want it.  But some 
economists think that, while there is a meaningful distinction between employment 
and non-employment, the distinction between unemployment and inactivity is 
meaningless.  On this view the fact that fewer women want paid work (largely 
because of domestic responsibilities) ‘spills over’ into a higher unemployment rate 
and does not simply show up in a lower labour force participation rate.  If this is true 
then, in some sense, the female unemployed in ‘high-gap’ countries may be less 
serious about wanting a job and taking steps to get one than the male unemployed.  
There are a number of ways in which one might test this hypothesis. 
Whether unemployment and inactivity are distinct labour market states was a 
question first posed by Flinn and Heckman (1983) and subsequently also addressed by 
Jones and Riddell (1999).   The basis of their tests is to see whether there is a 
significant difference between the probability of entering employment between those 
who are unemployed and those who are inactive. 
Table 8 reports results for this exercise for the countries in the ECHPS.  The 
sample is those who are either unemployed or inactive in the initial observation and 
the dependent variable is binary according to whether the individual is subsequently 
in employment or not.  We report the marginal effect of being in employment in a 
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month’s time of being unemployed rather than inactive.  We also interact a female 
dummy with this variable to see whether there are significant gender differences.  In 
all countries the unemployed are more likely to get a job than the inactive.  The extent 
of this is similar in ‘high-gap’ and ‘low-gap’ countries.  Further, the interaction of the 
‘initially unemployed’ variable with the female dummy is not noticeably smaller in 
the ‘high-gap’ countries as one would expect if the female unemployed are less 
serious about getting work than their male counterparts: indeed the interaction term is 
largest in some of the ‘high-gap’ countries.  There is no evidence here that, in the 
‘high-gap’ countries, the difference between the unemployed and the inactive is more 
blurred than in the ‘low-gap’ countries. 
Another way to consider the hypothesis that the female unemployed in some 
countries are less serious about getting work is to look at evidence on job search 
intensity.  Measuring search intensity is problematic and the only available evidence 
is on numbers and types of job search methods that the unemployed report using 
(though it should be noted that those who report using more search methods do 
typically have lower durations of unemployment so these measures do seem to 
capture something of what we might expect).  Table 9 presents evidence for the three 
countries for which we have been able to obtain it – Spain, the UK and the US.  There 
are sizeable and well-known differences in the use of different search methods across 
countries with, for example, the unemployed in the US being much less likely to 
report use of the public employment service and to report the use of personal contacts 
and the UK unemployed report the use of more search methods than those in the US 
and Spain11 (see Pellizari, 2003, for a cross-country comparison of search methods 
used to get jobs and the wage premia associated with them).  In all countries men 
                                                 
11 One should not make too much of this as the different countries allow respondents a different 
maximum number of search methods to be listed and this may influence responses although very few 
report the maximum allowed. 
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report using slightly more search methods than women but this gap is similar in Spain 
(a ‘high-gap’ country) and the US/UK (both ‘low-gap’ countries).  The limited 
evidence presented provides no support for the view that the women in ‘high-gap’ 
countries are much less serious in their desire for work as evidenced by their search 
effort. 
Another variant of this hypothesis is that the level and availability of welfare 
benefits affects exit rate from unemployment through an effect on the reservation 
wage.  Table 10 presents some data on the fraction of the unemployed of different 
genders who report receiving any form of welfare benefit.  In most countries women 
are less likely to receive welfare benefits than men, probably because their weaker 
employment history makes them less likely to have established entitlement and 
because unemployed women may be living with employed men so are not eligible for 
means-tested benefits.  Looking at this table it is very hard to see how it could 
possibly form the basis of an explanation as to why, in some countries, there is such a 
large gender gap in unemployment rates.  For example, virtually no-one, male or 
female, in Italy receives any benefits and the proportions of men and women doing so 
in Spain and the UK are very similar even though they have very different gender 
gaps in unemployment rates. 
However, while we might expect reservation wages to be influenced by 
welfare benefits, there are other factors that might be important in determining the 
minimum level of wages acceptable to the unemployed.  The ECHPS directly asks the 
unemployed about the minimum acceptable wage at which they would work.  The 
female unemployed report lower reservation wages than the male unemployed but this 
is unsurprising given the existence of a gender pay gap and a more pertinent question 
is whether the gap between reservation wages and the average level of wages is higher 
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for women than for men.  We used the ECHPS to compute gender gaps in both wages 
and reservation wages corrected for personal characteristics (note that to maintain 
comparability with our measure of the gender gap in unemployment rates as the 
female minus the male we measure all gender gaps in this way even though the 
gender gap in wages is normally measured the other way round).  We then computed 
a gender gap in the log of the reservation wage minus the log of the wage (we will call 
this, with some abuse of terminology the gender gap in the replacement ratio) and, in 
Figure 2, plot this against the gender gap in unemployment rates.  The gender gap in 
the replacement ratio is generally positive indicating a smaller gender gap in 
reservation wages than in actual wages.  But, there is no indication that the countries 
with a large gender gap in replacement ratios have a large gender gap in 
unemployment rates: indeed the regression line (shown on Figure 2) is negatively 
sloped albeit with a t-statistic of only 1.1. 
This section has explored the hypothesis that, for some reason, women in 
some countries who are classified as unemployed are not as serious about wanting 
work as the male unemployed or are more selective about the jobs they will take.  But, 
there is no evidence whatsoever for this hypothesis. 
Another possible hypothesis about why women in some countries seem to find 
it hard to get jobs is that employers are less likely to give women jobs.  The next 
section considers this. 
 
5. Do Employers favour Men? 
 There are a number of possible economic and social reasons why employers in 
some countries might favour men when it comes to filling jobs.  
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 A natural first place to start is the relationship between the gender gap in 
unemployment rate and the gender gap in wages: this is explored graphically in 
Figure 312.  There is a weak positive relationship between the two (the t-statistic is 
1.2) suggesting that countries in which women’s pay is a lot below men’s pay have 
lower gender gaps in unemployment rates.  As Blau and Kahn (2003) have suggested 
that cross-country differences in the gender pay gap can be better explained by 
gender-unspecific labour market institutions like the minimum wage and collective 
bargaining (all OECD countries now have some form of equal pay legislation), this 
could be taken as weak evidence that compressing the wage structure results in higher 
unemployment rates for those workers (here, women) who would, in a free market, 
earn relatively low wages.    But, this evidence is hardly overwhelming and the 
decision to employ a man rather than a woman may not be based on a comparison of 
wages alone. 
For example, one sometimes hears the argument that employers prefer to 
appoint men because hiring is costly and men are more likely to stick in their jobs or 
because women are more likely to take time off work because their children are 
sick13.  Even if this is true it cannot really explain why there is a gender gap in 
unemployment rates in some countries but not others.  In fact, in the Mediterranean 
countries where firing costs are high one would expect employers to be relatively 
more favourably inclined towards employing women as groups with a higher 
voluntary separation rate will be relatively attractive workers.  So, this hypothesis 
does not seem to have much mileage.  An alternative hypothesis is that differences in 
                                                 
12 These gender gaps come from a regression in which personal characteristics are also included. 
13 Or that because women are likely to work fewer hours than men, employers find it harder to cover 
the fixed costs of employment.  However these differences seem small: to give one example, among 
full-time workers men in Spain work 2.1 hours per week more than women while in the UK the gap is 
4.6 hours.  Among part-time workers Spanish women work 1.3 hours less than the men whereas British 
women work 0.4 hours more than the men (figures from the Labour Force Surveys).    
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maternity leave legislation make employers more favourably inclined towards men in 
some countries.  But, as Table 11 shows, the differences in maternity leave 
regulations across EU countries are relatively small and the Nordic countries which 
have generous maternity provisions also have small gender gaps in unemployment 
rates.  Ruhm (1998) found that maternity leave was positively associated with female 
employment to population ratios (he did not consider unemployment rates). 
 Of course, it may not be legislation that makes men more attractive to 
employers than women: it could be lower levels of accumulated labour market 
experience among unemployed women.  This might particularly be thought to be true 
in some of the ‘Mediterranean’ countries where, until recently, female labour market 
participation was very low.  To investigate this we estimated a model for the flows 
from unemployment to employment excluding and including information on the work 
history of the individual.  The ECHPS does not contain information on actual labour 
market experience and the best we can do is to include a variable denoting whether 
the individual has ever worked before and, if so, a variable measuring the length of 
time since last worked.  As Table 12 shows the inclusion of these variables does little 
to reduce the gender gap in flows from unemployment to employment, suggesting that 
differences in work history are relatively unimportant.     
Another hypothesis is prejudice or discrimination.  Employers may simply feel 
that women are less deserving of employment than men and make their hiring 
decisions accordingly.  We can get some idea as to how widespread are 
discriminatory attitudes from the 1996 Eurobarometer survey that asks respondents 
whether they agree with the statement “when jobs are scarce, men should have more 
right to a job than women”.  In all countries men are more likely than women to think 
that women are less deserving of employment.  But, there are also substantial 
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differences across countries with, crudely, the Nordic countries being less 
discriminatory and the Mediterranean countries more so.  There are also differences 
across regions within countries e.g. Southern Italy is more discriminatory than 
Northern Italy.  Figure 4 plots the proportion against the gender differential in the 
unemployment rate at regional level, marking the observations with a two-letter code 
for the country to which they refer.  There is a clear positive relationship between the 
two variables [with a t-stat of 4.65].  One might think that all of this is driven by 
differences across countries but a regression for the 139 regions shown in Figure 4 
that also includes country fixed effects leads to the following results (standard errors 
in parentheses): 
Gender gap in unemployment rate=2.47+5.71*prejudice+country fixed effects 
     (0.69) (1.98) 
so that there is a significant relationship between the gender gap in the unemployment 
rate and the extent of prejudice against women even within countries suggesting that 
some degree of discrimination may be partly responsible for the gender gap in 
unemployment rates.     
However, a problem with this hypothesis is that the discriminatory attitudes 
have been around for a long time (as can be confirmed by examination of the 1973 
and 1986 Eurobarometer surveys that contain similar questions) but, as Figure 1 
showed, large gender gaps in unemployment rates are a relatively recent phenomenon.  
One way to reconcile this is the following idea.  When overall unemployment rates 
are high and there are many applicants for most jobs, employers may be faced with a 
large number of job applicants who are more or less equivalent.  In this situation they 
are more or less free to indulge any slight discriminatory preferences they may have 
without suffering any loss in profits from doing so (Becker’s, 1957, model of 
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discrimination would predict this).  In contrast, in tight labour markets, waiting for a 
male job applicant rather than hiring a female one may be a much more costly 
strategy.  Hence, putting prejudices into practice is easier when unemployment is high 
and there are long queues for jobs as has been the situation in most of the ‘high-gap’ 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s.  This does not mean that the exercise of such 
prejudice is costless: to the extent that certain groups are protected from competition 
for jobs from other groups, the result is likely to be higher wage pressure and a higher 
natural rate of unemployment.  This conclusion is usually derived in the context of 
prejudice against the long-term unemployed (see, for example, the ‘ranking’ model of 
Blanchard and Diamond, 1994) but the same principles apply to other sorts of 
prejudice.    
 A similar idea to this can be found in a recent paper by Algan and Cahuc 
(2003) who focus on gender differences in employment-population ratios across 
countries.  They suggest that a ‘male breadwinner’ mindset, associated with the 
Catholic religion, can explain the cross-country variation.  This is similar to the idea 
we have expressed here but they argue that the institutional form that this 
discrimination takes is job protection legislation that penalizes groups of workers (like 
women who have more domestic responsibilities) who have weaker labour market 
attachment.  But, it is not obvious that this hypothesis can explain much of the gender 
gaps in the flows between employment and unemployment that we have found. 
 
6. Mismatch 
The previous two sections have explored the hypotheses that the female unemployed 
in some countries might be less serious about getting work than men and that 
employers might be less inclined to give jobs to women.  Another possibility is that 
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there is simply a mismatch between the desires of the female unemployed in terms of 
jobs they like and the jobs that employers are offering.  Perhaps the most plausible 
form of mismatch is that women may want part-time jobs but these are very rare in 
some countries. 
 We do have some way of investigating this mismatch hypothesis as a number 
of surveys ask the unemployed whether they are looking for full- or part-time 
employment.  Table 13 presents the raw data.  There is not much evidence here that 
there is a large disparity between the type of jobs that women report they want and the 
type of jobs that are available.  For example in Spain the desire for part-time 
employment among the unemployed is lower than the incidence of part-time working 
in the employed population (see also Petrongolo, 2003, for evidence that, in ‘high-
gap’ countries a higher proportion of women working part-time report that they would 
prefer a full-time job which is also consistent with this).  It seems more likely that, if 
there is a deficit of part-time jobs in some countries, this results primarily in lower 
female labour force participation and not in higher unemployment rates.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In many of the European countries with high unemployment rates, the female 
unemployment rate is substantially above the male.  This important gender gap has 
hardly been studied: remedying that deficiency is the purpose of this paper. We show 
that, in the countries with a large gender gap in unemployment rates, there tends to be 
a large gender gap in both flows from employment into unemployment and from 
unemployment into employment.   
Providing explanations for this is not so easy and it is much simpler to present 
evidence against hypotheses than evidence in favour of them.  For example, the 
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gender gap is not well-explained by differences in the type of jobs that men and 
women do, by differences in benefit receipt, by differences in the gender wage gap, 
by differences in search intensity and by differences in labour market transitions 
caused by the allocation of domestic responsibilities.  There does seem to be some 
correlation with social attitudes about whether men are more deserving of work than 
women but, at the end of the paper one is left with a large part of this gender gap that 
we are incapable of explaining.  This, of course has its parallels in the literature on the 
gender pay gap, which economists have also struggled to fully account for.  An 
unsatisfactory conclusion, but one that can, as usual, be used as a call for further 
research.  
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Table 1 
Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates Among OECD Countries 
 
  All Working Age (15-64) Prime-Age (25-54) 
Country Male Female Difference Ratio Male Female Difference Ratio 
Spain  11 22.91 11.91 2.08 9.2 21 11.8 2.28 
Greece  7.56 17.92 10.36 2.37 6.2 15.2 9 2.45 
Italy  8.67 15.71 7.04 1.81 6.6 12.7 6.1 1.92 
France  9.66 12.96 3.3 1.34 9 12.6 3.6 1.4 
Belgium  . .     6.1 9 2.9 1.48 
Netherlands  2.74 4.49 1.75 1.64 2.1 3.8 1.7 1.81 
Luxembourg  1.77 2.68 0.91 1.51 1.4 2.9 1.5 2.07 
Germany  8.15 9.22 1.07 1.13 7.2 8.5 1.3 1.18 
Denmark  4.69 6.54 1.85 1.39 3.7 4.9 1.2 1.32 
Portugal  3.84 5.05 1.21 1.32 3.4 4.6 1.2 1.35 
Finland  9.58 10.73 1.15 1.12 7.9 9 1.1 1.14 
Switzerland  2.52 3.68 1.16 1.46 2.2 3.2 1 1.45 
Japan  4.82 4.46 -0.36 0.93 3.7 4.4 0.7 1.19 
Sweden  7.5 6.76 -0.74 0.9 5.2 5.9 0.7 1.13 
USA  4.05 4.33 0.28 1.07 3 3.4 0.4 1.13 
Austria  3.69 3.85 0.16 1.04 3.4 3.6 0.2 1.06 
Australia  7.13 6.64 -0.49 0.93 5.5 5.3 -0.2 0.96 
Canada  7.78 7.25 -0.53 0.93 6.5 6.3 -0.2 0.97 
NZ 6.94 6.58 -0.36 0.95 5.5 5.3 -0.2 0.96 
Norway  3.36 3.05 -0.31 0.91 2.6 2.2 -0.4 0.85 
Ireland  5.9 5.5 -0.4 0.93 5.7 4.8 -0.9 0.84 
UK  6.75 5.07 -1.68 0.75 5.4 4.3 -1.1 0.8 
New OECD 
Countries                 
Hungary  7.52 6.26 -1.26 0.83 6.7 5.6 -1.1 0.84 
Turkey  7.49 7.5 0.01 1 5.9 5.5 -0.4 0.93 
Mexico  1.78 2.58 0.8 1.45 1.6 2.1 0.5 1.31 
Czech Rep 7.27 10.5 3.23 1.44 5.9 9.5 3.6 1.61 
 
Notes. 
1. Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics (OECD Statistical Compendium), 1999.
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Table 2 
The Marginal Effects of Characteristics on Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates 
A B C  
   Female  Female Female 
F*Age(15-
24) 
F*Age(35-
44) 
F*Age(45-
54) 
F*Low 
Edu 
F*High 
Edu F*Married F*Div/Sep 
F*Kids(0-
12) 
F*Kids(13-
15) 
0.087 0.086 0.052 0.078 -0.06 -0.017 -0.004 -0.012 0.075 -0.075 0.035 -0.013 
Spain  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003] [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.004]** 
0.112 0.102 0.067 0.054 -0.03 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.03 -0.011 0.026 0.038 
Greece  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.002]** [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]** [0.005]* [0.003]** [0.004]** 
0.062 0.056 0.045 0.028 -0.06 0.002 0.025 -0.011 0.036 0.006 0.007 -0.011 
Italy  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002] [0.004]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.005] [0.002]** [0.003]** 
0.053 0.053 0.042 0.004 -0.03 -0.019 -0.023 -0.001 0.039 -0.005 0.043 0.026 
France  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.003] [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002] [0.002]** [0.003] [0.002]** [0.004]** 
0.084 0.079 0.058 0.017 -0.03 -0.001 -0.066 0.003 0.058 0.086 0.043 -0.024 
Belgium  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.005]** [0.002]** [0.003] [0.002]** [0.003] [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.004]** [0.004]** 
0.036 0.033 -0.004 0.016 0.001 0.009 -0.006 -0.001 0.045 0.029 0.028 0.028 
Netherlands [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.005] [0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.009]** [0.013]* [0.008]** [0.010]** 
0.007 0 -0.015 0.013 0.02 0.002 0.014 -0.004 0.044 0.014 0.002 -0.009 
Luxembourg [0.001]** [0.001] [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.002] [0.003]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.002] [0.002]** 
0.035 0.028 -0.009 0.01 0.02 0.015 -0.024 -0.026 0.05 0.003 0.048 0.019 
Germany  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.003] [0.002]** [0.003]** 
0.046 0.045 0.043 -0.023 -0.02 -0.023 -0.022 0.032 0.011 -0.011 0.059 0.046 
Denmark  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.007]** 
0.049 0.053 -0.008 0.054 -0.01 -0.008 0 0.022 0.043 -0.013 0.041 0.01 
Portugal  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.002]* [0.002]** [0.005] [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.003]** 
0.019 0.032 0.007 -0.009 -0.01 -0.003 0.002 -0.007 0.044 0.024 0.021 -0.003 
Finland  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003]* [0.004]* [0.003]** [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]* [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.003]** [0.004] 
0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.01 0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.012  0   
USA  [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001] [0.001]** [0.001]* [0.001]**  [0.001]   
0.01 0.005 -0.006 0.016 0.01 0.011 -0.002 0.005 -0.008 0.023 0.024 0.031 
Austria  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004] [0.002]* [0.002]** [0.004]** [0.002]** [0.005]** 
-0.049 -0.035 -0.006 0.038 -0.04 -0.027 0.021 0.005 -0.042 -0.06 -0.027 -0.019 
Ireland  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003]* [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.003]* [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.003]** 
-0.037 -0.036 -0.044 0.016 0 0.012 0.018 0 -0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
UK  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002] [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002] [0.002]* [0.002] [0.001]* [0.002] 
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Notes:  
1. Data for European countries come from ECHPS, data for US from CPS.  The sample is restricted to to those aged 15-54 inclusive.  Dependent 
variable is whether individual is unemployed conditional on being in the labour force.  The reported coefficients are the marginal effects. 
2. Coefficient in Column marked A is that on female dummy in probit model of (1).  Coefficient in Column marked B is that on female dummy in probit 
model of (2) where the controls are age, education (high being college graduates, ISCED 5-7, and low being less than second stage of secondary education, 
ISCED 0-2), marital status and number of children aged 0-12 and 13-15.  Coefficient in Column marked C and subsequent columns is that on female dummy 
and female dummy interacted with characteristics in probit model of (3). 
3. Standard errors in parentheses. ** denotes 1% significance level and  * denotes 5% significance level. 
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Table 3a 
Flows between Labour Market States and Implied Steady-State Unemployment Rates: Men 
  heu hei hue hui hiu hie heu/heu+hue 
(hiuhei) 
(hiuhei+hiehui) α 
Implied Steady-State 
U-Rate 
Actual  
U-Rate 
Spain  1.5 0.37 7.43 0.85 0.72 1.16 16.8 21.3 0.07 17.1 17.8 
Greece  0.63 0.21 9.4 0.61 0.44 0.99 6.3 13.4 0.05 6.6 9.4 
Italy  0.52 0.32 3.93 0.71 0.64 0.73 11.7 28.6 0.11 13.5 12.6 
France  0.61 0.29 8.43 1.85 0.86 1.33 6.7 9.2 0.12 7 10.1 
Belgium  0.35 0.23 5.19 0.68 0.46 0.99 6.3 13.7 0.09 6.9 6 
Luxembourg 0.21 0.29 10.69 0.72 0.3 1.82 2 6.1 0.06 2.2  2.6 
Germany  0.57 0.29 7.42 1.44 0.42 1.72 7.1 4.7 0.13 6.8 6.1 
Denmark  0.69 0.38 10.65 1.72 0.81 2.07 6.1 7.9 0.11 6.3 8.7 
Portugal  0.43 0.23 7.44 0.84 0.35 1.14 5.5 7.9 0.08 5.7 5.2 
Finland  0.92 1.01 9.06 2.63 0.97 3.44 9.3 9.8 0.19 9.3 11.2 
USA  1.26 1.37 51.35 29.22 6.11 10.7 2.4 2.6 0.27 2.5 3.4 
Austria  0.61 0.37 14.12 1.35 0.31 1.52 4.1 5.2 0.07 4.2 3.1 
Ireland  0.57 0.38 4.57 0.54 0.76 2.54 11.2 17.5 0.09 11.7 12.5 
UK  0.61 0.25 7.7 1.49 0.96 1.7 7.4 8.8 0.11 7.5 6.7 
 
 
Notes. 
1. Data for European countries are from retrospective monthly work history data in ECHPS.  Retrospective monthly data from Sweden 
and Netherlands is missing. US data from successive monthly CPS. Sample restricted to those aged between 25 and 54.   
2. Hazard Rates are estimated using the methodology described in (7). 
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Table 3b 
Flows between Labour Market States and Implied Steady-State Unemployment Rates: Women 
  heu hei hue hui hiu hie heu/heu+hue 
(hiuhei) 
(hiuhei+hiehui) α 
Implied Steady-
State U-Rate 
Actual  
U-Rate 
Spain  1.9 0.89 5.62 1.49 0.37 0.55 25.3 28.7 0.14 25.8 31.9 
Greece  1.05 0.79 5.75 1.1 0.25 0.55 15.5 24.9 0.13 16.7 23 
Italy  0.74 0.7 3.62 1.11 0.3 0.45 17 29.5 0.18 19.2 24.2 
France  0.76 0.44 6.29 1.99 0.49 0.79 10.7 12.1 0.17 11 16.2 
Belgium  0.56 0.65 3.19 0.96 0.33 0.92 14.8 19.3 0.19 15.7 9.7 
Luxembourg 0.23 0.66 8.61 2.13 0.09 0.83 2.6 3.3 0.18 2.7  5.9 
Germany  0.61 0.45 5.03 1.46 0.23 0.97 10.8 6.8 0.18 10 9.6 
Denmark  0.93 0.65 7.11 2.54 0.83 1.97 11.6 9.7 0.2 11.2 9.3 
Portugal  0.62 0.43 5.85 1 0.21 0.66 9.6 12.1 0.12 9.8 10.5 
Finland  1.14 1.59 8.74 3.45 0.91 3.22 11.5 11.6 0.24 11.5 12 
USA  1.09 2.69 51.09 46.41 3.59 7.25 2.1 2.8 0.38 2.4 3 
Austria  0.59 0.65 9.23 2.11 0.18 0.77 6 6.6 0.16 6.1 5.4 
Ireland  0.62 1.24 8.63 2.32 0.18 1.15 6.7 7.6 0.19 6.9 12.4 
UK  0.39 0.85 10.27 4.06 0.39 1.64 3.6 4.7 0.24 3.9 4 
 
 
Notes. 
 
1. As for Table 3a.
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Table 4a 
Gender Gaps in Labour Market Transition Rates: No Other Controls 
 
Country E→U U→E  U→I E→I I→U I→E 
0.236 -0.278 0.564 0.878 -0.67 -0.746 
Spain  [0.045]** [0.037]** [0.063]** [0.056]** [0.059]** [0.053]** 
0.517 -0.489 0.595 1.32 -0.544 -0.578 
Greece [0.066]** [0.058]** [0.127]** [0.067]** [0.091]** [0.066]** 
0.351 -0.081 0.446 0.775 -0.772 -0.487 
Italy [0.063]** [0.055] [0.077]** [0.054]** [0.061]** [0.063]** 
0.217 -0.291 0.077 0.423 -0.558 -0.511 
France [0.062]** [0.059]** [0.086] [0.064]** [0.088]** [0.072]** 
0.472 -0.485 0.339 1.017 -0.327 -0.062 
Belgium [0.102]** [0.111]** [0.172]* [0.094]** [0.142]* [0.106] 
0.065 -0.216 1.082 0.818 -1.17 -0.778 
Luxembourg [0.125] [0.112] [0.277]** [0.081]** [0.207]** [0.089]** 
0.067 -0.385 0.014 0.45 -0.614 -0.566 
Germany [0.043] [0.046]** [0.074] [0.051]** [0.088]** [0.049]** 
0.302 -0.4 0.392 0.544 0.023 -0.049 
Denmark [0.072]** [0.069]** [0.112]** [0.081]** [0.116] [0.078] 
0.36 -0.237 0.171 0.603 -0.517 -0.548 
Portugal [0.071]** [0.065]** [0.121] [0.068]** [0.102]** [0.062]** 
0.206 -0.029 0.28 0.458 -0.06 -0.063 
Finland [0.067]** [0.061] (3.22)** (7.91)** [0.087] [0.049] 
-0.142 -0.005 0.463 0.463 -0.532 -0.39 
USA [0.013]** [0.012] [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.010]** 
-0.029 -0.421 0.452 0.569 -0.551 -0.68 
Austria [0.092] [0.103]** [0.163]** [0.074]** [0.145]** [0.073]** 
0.074 0.631 1.457 1.176 -1.453 -0.789 
Ireland [0.077] [0.077]** [0.139]** [0.071]** [0.111]** [0.061]** 
-0.463 0.29 1.001 1.207 -0.908 -0.033 
UK [0.054]** [0.054]** [0.077]** [0.051]** [0.071]** [0.046] 
 
Notes. 
1. Data as for Table 3a.   
2. These represent the coefficients on a female dummy for the method for 
estimating hazard rates described in the text i.e. the models of (7) and (8).  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4b 
Gender Gaps in Labour Market Transition Rates: With Controls 
 
Country E→U U→E  U→I E→I I→U I→E 
0.275 -0.354 0.575 0.884 -0.366 -0.574 
Spain  [0.045]** [0.038]** [0.066]** [0.060]** [0.067]** [0.061]** 
0.538 -0.47 0.551 1.312 -0.002 -0.608 
Greece [0.067]** [0.058]** [0.133]** [0.067]** [0.103] [0.081]** 
0.394 -0.138 0.359 0.849 -0.263 -0.641 
Italy [0.064]** [0.057]* [0.081]** [0.056]** [0.066]** [0.080]** 
0.266 -0.341 -0.008 0.422 -0.497 -0.525 
France [0.061]** [0.059]** [0.088] [0.065]** [0.111]** [0.085]** 
0.466 -0.49 0.424 1.059 -0.245 -0.343 
Belgium [0.100]** [0.115]** [0.187]* [0.095]** [0.158] [0.123]** 
-0.189 -0.195 0.94 0.93 -0.698 -0.641 
Luxembourg [0.128] [0.111] [0.287]** [0.086]** [0.266]** [0.114]** 
0.012 -0.425 0.05 0.395 -0.519 -0.34 
Germany [0.043] [0.046]** [0.075] [0.053]** [0.110]** [0.059]** 
0.371 -0.432 0.387 0.609 -0.064 0.026 
Denmark [0.071]** [0.068]** [0.116]** [0.080]** [0.114] [0.075] 
0.446 -0.3 0.16 0.69 -0.257 -0.56 
Portugal [0.073]** [0.068]** [0.122] [0.069]** [0.111]* [0.069]** 
0.344 -0.068 0.28 0.629 -0.341 -0.179 
Finland [0.066]** [0.060] [0.088]** [0.061]** [0.093]** [0.048]** 
-0.114 -0.012 0.474 0.474 -0.463 -0.436 
USA [0.013]** [0.012] [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.015]** [0.011]** 
-0.05 -0.511 0.578 0.527 -0.408 -0.509 
Austria [0.093] [0.102]** [0.168]** [7.12]** [0.176]* [0.079]** 
0.062 0.401 1.058 1.174 -0.687 -0.22 
Ireland [0.080] [0.079]** [0.164]** [0.077]** [0.129]** [0.057]** 
-0.473 0.292 1.019 1.206 -0.76 -0.111 
UK [0.054]** [0.053]** [0.078]** [0.051]** [0.084]** [0.050]* 
 
Notes. 
 
1. Data as for Table 3a.  Controls are age, education, marital status and 
number of children. 
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Table 5 
Gender Gaps in Unemployment Durations 
 
Country 
% of unemployed with duration 
>6mths 
% of unemployed with duration 
>12mths 
 Men Women Gender Gap Men Women Gender Gap 
Spain 62.1 72 9.9 45.4 55.5 10.1 
Greece 69 77.7 8.7 48.6 59.5 10.9 
Italy 76.6 77.7 1.1 62.1 60.7 -1.4 
France 53.7 57.4 3.7 39 41.7 2.7 
Belgium 73.2 73.8 0.6 60.1 60.9 0.8 
Netherlands 75.1 84.9 9.8 47.7 40.4 -7.3 
Luxembourg 61.6 47.5 -14.1 38.6 27.2 -11.4 
Germany 65.3 69.4 4.1 49.9 54 4.1 
Denmark 38.6 38.5 -0.1 20.9 20.1 -0.8 
Portugal 63.5 64.2 0.7 39.5 42.9 3.4 
Finland 49.2 43.7 -5.5 33.1 26.2 -6.9 
Switzerland 59.3 63.1 3.8 40.6 38.7 -1.9 
Japan 49.5 36.9 -12.6 27.4 14.8 -12.6 
Sweden 48.5 41.2 -7.3 33.3 26.1 -7.2 
USA 13 11.6 -1.4 7.4 6.2 -1.2 
Austria 43.6 39.8 -3.8 32.7 24.1 -8.6 
Australia 50.9 44.9 -6 31.8 25.8 -6 
Canada 23.3 18.9 -4.4 12.8 10.2 -2.6 
NZ 42.5 34.3 -8.2 23 17.9 -5.1 
Norway 17.1 15.6 -1.5 7.3 6.3 -1 
Ireland 77.8 72.9 -4.9 59.5 47.5 -12 
UK 50.1 37.6 -12.5 34.5 21.5 -13 
 
Notes: 
1. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1999.  
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Table 6 
Gender Differences in Flows from Employment to Unemployment 
 
No 
Controls 
Controls on 
Personal 
Characteristics Controls on Personal Characteristics and 
Interactions 
Controls on 
Personal and 
Job 
Characteristics
Country 
Coefficient 
on 
Female 
dummy 
Coefficient on 
Female 
dummy 
Coefficient 
on 
Female 
Dummy 
Coefficient 
on 
Female* 
married 
Coefficient 
on 
Female* 
kids0-12 
Coefficient 
on 
Female* 
kids13-15 
Coefficient on 
Female 
dummy 
0.222 0.239 0.199 0.01 0.071 0.167 0.141 
Spain  [0.052]** [0.054]** [0.080]* [0.116] [0.141] [0.194] [0.060]* 
0.531 0.549 0.516 0.01 0.061 0.364 0.554 
Greece  [0.074]** [0.076]** [0.114]** [0.169] [0.214] [0.285] [0.084]** 
0.056 0.136 0.1 -0.134 0.254 0.205 0.018 
Italy  [0.070] [0.071] [0.098] [0.160] [0.195] [0.277] [0.077] 
0.357 0.432 0.158 0.394 0.358 -0.393 0.279 
France  [0.096]** [0.097]** [0.152] [0.207] [0.232] [0.422] [0.118]* 
0.717 0.803 0.449 0.348 0.677 0.039 0.729 
Belgium  [0.132]** [0.134]** [0.207]* [0.284] [0.391] [0.657] [0.162]** 
0.597 1.007 0.168 0.527 0.172 0.592 1.152 
Netherlands  [0.133]** [0.118]** [0.202] [0.305] [0.353] [0.443] [0.150]** 
0.334 0.28 -0.43 1.511 -0.069 -0.014 0.149 
Luxembourg  [0.296] [0.302] [0.515] [0.688]* [0.796] [1.491] [0.394] 
0.153 0.083 -0.374 0.486 0.289 0.468 0.108 
Germany  [0.053]** [0.054] [0.090]** [0.115]** [0.135]* [0.213]* [0.065] 
0.612 0.636 0.238 0.206 0.586 13.362 0.502 
Denmark  [0.118]** [0.120]** [0.173] [0.249] [0.323] [363.531] [0.140]** 
0.448 0.543 0.243 -0.006 0.681 0.427 0.49 
Portugal  [0.078]** [0.080]** [0.136] [0.169] [0.191]** [0.275] [0.086]** 
0.358 0.435 0.204 0.405 0.011 -0.071 0.451 
Finland  [0.124]** [0.127]** [0.214] [0.271] [0.290] [0.421] [0.153]** 
0.014 0.205 0.117 0.095 -0.36 -0.02 0.367 
Sweden  [0.093] [0.125] [0.169] [0.196] [0.211] [0.280] [0.151]* 
0.29 -0.011 0.271 -0.691 0.712 0.211 -0.202 
Austria  [0.122]* [0.111] [0.197] [0.260]** [0.279]* [0.498] [0.131] 
-0.103 -0.223 0.12 -0.232 -0.048 -0.521 -0.234 
Ireland  [0.108] [0.089]* [0.175] [0.235] [0.271] [0.413] [0.103]* 
-0.188 0.028 -0.211 -0.129 0.091 0.314 0.032 
UK  [0.089]* [0.094] [0.131] [0.187] [0.245] [0.341] [0.104] 
Notes. 
1. Data is from ECHPS.  The sample is all those who are employed at one 
interview and employed or unemployed subsequently.  Model estimated is 
a cloglog model where the dependent variable takes the value one if the 
individual is still employed. 
2. Standard errors in parentheses. 
3. The ILO main activity status is used for Sweden as the Self-Defined main 
activity status question, used for the other countries, is not asked. 
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Table 7a 
Reasons for leaving Previous Job (%): Currently Unemployed 
 
  Obliged  Sick 
    
by 
Employer 
End of 
Contract 
Child 
Birth/ 
Care /Disabled Retired Other* 
Sample 
Size 
M 22 63 0 3 0 12 3575 
Spain  F 17 64 5 2 0 12 2652 
M 38 37 0 3 2 21 1097 
Greece F 38 39 5 1 2 15 1331 
M 39 36 1 4 8 11 1494 
Italy F 28 46 4 3 10 9 1169 
M 41 44 0 3 0 12 999 
France F 34 44 6 2 0 15 1271 
M 55 18 0 0 8 19 536 
Belgium F 43 22 8 11 1 14 939 
M 30 15 2 34 2 17 709 
Netherlands F 12 12 42 13 1 21 1917 
M 59 20 0 2 9 10 2191 
Germany F 54 22 1 2 9 12 2421 
M 42 26 1 9 1 21 590 
Denmark F 36 29 7 10 3 16 906 
M 24 40 0 5 2 30 971 
Portugal F 24 44 4 5 1 23 1252 
M 28 57 0 2 1 11 1009 
Finland F 22 60 4 3 1 10 1123 
M 43 10 1 1 33 13 464 
Austria F 33 15 18 11 1 22 398 
M 41 33 1 6 0 19 1393 
Ireland F 26 33 3 9 0 29 409 
M 45 18 1 6 15 16 1332 
UK F 23 16 16 7 17 21 611 
 
 
Note:  
1. Data from ECHPS.  Question only asked of those who have worked within the 
last two years. 
2. Other reasons includes: Marriage, Move for partner's job, Closure of own 
business & Study/National service. 
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Table 7b 
Reasons for leaving Previous Job (%): Currently Inactive 
 
  Obliged  Sick/ 
    
by 
Employer 
End of 
Contract 
Child 
Birth/ 
Care Disabled Retired Other* 
Sample 
Size 
M 20 20 0 32 7 21 3259 
Spain  F 12 30 16 12 1 28 5105 
M 10 5 0 15 60 10 1895 
Greece F 16 13 22 11 5 33 2374 
M 16 6 0 13 52 13 3832 
Italy F 13 12 21 7 29 17 4645 
M 33 5 1 19 35 6 1805 
France F 17 11 21 13 16 22 3029 
M 37 2 0 22 32 7 949 
Belgium F 21 8 16 16 16 23 1419 
M 8 4 1 34 28 24 1598 
Netherlands F 7 8 38 16 4 27 3490 
M 46 10 0 11 19 15 3416 
Germany F 27 8 19 5 18 24 6850 
M 10 11 0 30 17 32 969 
Denmark F 12 14 5 27 14 29 1737 
M 4 5 0 32 41 18 1671 
Portugal F 6 12 11 26 16 29 2767 
M 10 31 0 23 10 25 2029 
Finland F 9 34 9 16 7 25 2631 
M 12 2 0 36 34 16 1575 
Austria F 9 3 36 15 21 17 2581 
M 18 7 1 33 10 30 1297 
Ireland F 11 10 36 12 1 30 3622 
M 22 6 4 18 33 17 1949 
UK F 12 6 36 8 22 16 6318 
 
 
Notes: 
1. As for Table 7a. 
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Table 8 
Are the Unemployed More Likely than the Inactive to Get a Job? 
 
  Female   
Female& 
Unemployed 
in t=0   
Unemployed 
in t=0 
-0.124   0.418   1.702 
Spain  [0.164]   [0.069]**   [0.047]** 
-0.302  0.426  1.985 
Greece [0.253]  [0.105]**  [0.074]** 
-1.04   0.611   1.452 
Italy [0.324]**   [0.100]**   [0.070]** 
-0.269  0.19  1.557 
France [0.196]  [0.100]  [0.077]** 
-0.836   -0.513   1.396 
Belgium [0.347]*   [0.169]**   [0.131]** 
-0.203  0.317  0.793 
Luxembourg [0.325]  [0.159]*  [0.112]** 
-0.093   0.094   1.392 
Germany [0.157]   [0.070]   [0.051]** 
-0.428  -0.434  1.78 
Denmark [0.219]  [0.104]**  [0.081]** 
-0.346   0.289   1.724 
Portugal [0.227]   [0.097]**   [0.070]** 
0.059  0.137  0.911 
Finland [0.196]  [0.078]  [0.059]** 
-0.035   0.266   1.145 
USA [0.026]   [0.016]**   [0.012]** 
-0.45  0.171  2.149 
Austria [0.303]  [0.129]  [0.092]** 
-0.341   0.491   0.972 
Ireland [0.265]   [0.104]**   [0.067]** 
-0.179  0.235  1.579 
UK [0.138]   [0.073]**   [0.055]** 
 
Notes. 
 
1. The sample is all those who are not in employment in an initial month and 
the dependent variable is whether they are still not in employment a month 
later.  The other controls included are: age, education level, gender, 
presence and age of children and the gender dummy interacted with the 
other controls.  
2. Data for European countries from ECHPS retrospective work history data; 
data for US from successive monthly CPS files.  
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Table 9 
Methods of Job Search Among the Unemployed (%) 
 
 
 
 
US (CPS)  
method mentioned 
 
UK (LFS) 
method mentioned 
 
Spain (LFS) 
method mentioned 
 
 
 
Men 
 
Women 
 
Men 
 
Women 
 
Men 
 
Women 
 
contacted public 
employment service 
or other public body 
 
22.2 
 
19.9 
 
83.9 
 
63.0 88.6 86.0 
 
applied directly to 
employers 
 
66.2 
 
62.8 
 
57.4 
 
49.1 25.4 20.0 
 
placed or answered 
advertisements 
 
16.5 
 
16.4 
 
65.0 
 
60.6 14.2 16.7 
 
sent out 
resumes/applications 
 
39.0 
 
44.4 
 
47.1 
 
45.2 5.7 7.1 
 
looked at 
advertisements 
 
20.9 
 
21.6 
 
90.9 
 
91.7 14.8 17.4 
 
contacted friends/ 
relatives/unions 
 
19.8 
 
13.9 
 
70.1 
 
60.4 51.2 48.0 
 
private employment 
agency 
 
6.5 
 
6.5 
 
24.1 
 
18.4 3.2 4.0 
 
other 
 
8.6 
 
9.0 
 
9.3 
 
7.5 5.1 7.1 
 
Average number of  
search methods 
 
2.00 
 
1.94 
 
4.70 
 
4.08 
 
1.98 
 
1.96 
Number of 
observations 92,001 92,001 117,941 70,152 284,684 328,296 
 
Notes. 
1. Data from the CPS is from the period 1/97-12/98; from the UK and Spanish 
LFS is for 3/1992-2/2003. 
2. The classification of search methods is different in the three countries and 
some re-classification has been done. 
3. For Spain, data on the method “looked at advertisements” is only available 
after 1999. 
4. For Spain, until 1998, the maximum number of methods respondents could 
answer was 3. From 1/1999 to 3/2002, the fraction of unemployed answering 
“4 or more methods” was 15.9% for males and 15.7% for females. 
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Table 10 
Benefit Receipt Among the Unemployed 
 
Country Male Female 
Spain  34.56 15.86 
Greece  13.62 9.41 
Italy  4.29 3.28 
France  51.01 40.55 
Belgium  79.85 73.99 
Luxembourg 22.22 17.86 
Germany  68.7 69.44 
Denmark  85.8 83.72 
Portugal  26.92 23.37 
Finland  79.66 75.43 
Austria  59.45 43.5 
Ireland  87.86 44.9 
UK  33.25 17.21 
 
 
Notes. 
 
1. Source: ECHPS.  The question asked is “Do you receive unemployment 
benefit or assistance?” 
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Table 11 
Maternity Leave Legislation, 1999-2000 
 Maternity Leave Parental Leave 
Country Length 
(weeks) 
Payment       
(% earnings) 
Continuation of 
payment by 
employer 
Length              
(months) 
Maximum 
child age 
(years) 
Payment 
Austria  16 100 low wage workers 3 –24 2 410 euros/month 
Netherlands 16 100 No 6 8 unpaid 
Spain  16 100 No - 3 unpaid 
Luxembourg 16 - No 6 5 1487 euros/month 
Germany 14 100 No - 3 306 euros/month 
Greece  14 100 No 3.5 3.5 unpaid 
Italy  18 80 No 10 3 30%earnings 
France  16-26 84 Yes - 3 461 euros/month 
UK 14 90 No 3.25 5 unpaid 
Portugal  12.5 100 No 6 3 unpaid 
Denmark  18 67 Yes 2-12 8 920 euros/month 
Finland  17.5 66 Yes 6.5 3 10 euros/day 
Belgium  15 82 first month,  75 rest No 3 4 505 euros/month 
Ireland  14 70 No 3.5 5 unpaid 
Sweden 12 80 - 18 8 80%earnings 
USA 12 unpaid No - - - 
       
Notes. 
1. The Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 sets a minimum of period of 14 weeks 
(including the two weeks before and after birth) of maternity leave. The amount of maternity 
pay is fixed by the national legislation of the country and should be at least equal to the value 
of sick pay. 
2. There is no EU regulation regarding paternity leave. In most countries this is, at most, just a 
few days after birth.  
3. Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 sets a minimum period of 3 months of parental 
leave. Both parents have a three months entitlement, but one parent cannot transfer the right to 
parental leave to the other. Payment is legislated at country level. Directive 97/75/EC extends 
the scope of Directive 96/34/EC to the United Kingdom. 
4. For the USA, maternity leave is regulated within the Family and Medical Leave Act (1993). It 
allows eligible employees (tenure >1year) of a covered employer (number of employees> 50) 
to take unpaid leave (or to substitute paid leave if the employee has earned or accrued it) 
because birth/care of a child as well as for health conditions of the employee or family 
member. 
5. In Denmark, payments are based on unemployment benefits. 
6. In the UK, only employees with tenure of more than 26 weeks are eligible for maternity pay. 
Employees with more than 1 year of employment with the same employer have the right of 
“additional” maternity leave. 
7. In France, parental leave is paid only for workers having 2 or more children. 
8. In Germany, parental leave is paid until the child is 2 years old and for workers below a 
certain household income. 
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Table 12 
The Impact of Work History on the Flows from Unemployment to Employment 
 
 
  
No 
Controls 
for Work 
History 
With 
Controls 
for Work 
History 
-0.217 -0.286 
Spain  [0.046]** [0.048]** 
-0.529 -0.545 
Greece [0.065]** [0.069]** 
-0.305 -0.374 
Italy [0.058]** [0.060]** 
-0.282 -0.316 
France [0.092]** [0.095]** 
-0.52 -0.511 
Belgium [0.132]** [0.141]** 
-0.69 -0.513 
Netherlands [0.099]** [0.107]** 
-0.26 1.302 
Luxembourg [0.441] [1.005] 
-0.22 -0.182 
Germany [0.060]** [0.062]** 
-0.324 -0.312 
Denmark [0.117]** [0.124]* 
-0.245 -0.223 
Portugal [0.070]** [0.074]** 
-0.013 -0.074 
Finland [0.118] [0.126] 
-0.138 -0.166 
Sweden [0.103] [0.109] 
0.207 0.275 
Austria [0.138] [0.150] 
0.54 0.309 
Ireland [0.092]** [0.106]** 
0.473 0.381 
UK [0.087]** [0.091]** 
 
Notes: 
1. Source is ECHPS Annual Data.  Sample is those currently unemployed who 
are either unemployed or employed at the subsequent interview.  Other controls 
included are age, education, marital status and number of children. 
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Table 13 
Part-time Employment 
 
 Female Male 
 
Unemployed 
wanting PT 
work (%) 
Employed 
Working 
Part-Time 
(%) 
Unemployed 
wanting PT 
work (%) 
Employed 
Working 
Part-Time 
(%) 
Spain  7.8 16.5 1.3 2.6 
Greece  6.8 5.7 0 2.6 
Italy  34.4 12.4 3.7 2.8 
France  23.2 30 2.7 5.3 
Belgium  20.1 34 2.1 3.2 
Netherlands  72.4 68.7 15.3 16.7 
Luxembourg  36.1 18.1 0 1.3 
Germany  23.7 33.6 3.2 3.3 
Denmark  16.3 35.1 0 11.4 
Portugal  0 8.3 0 1.6 
Finland  7.1 15.2 0 6.5 
Sweden  19.4 42.6 2.9 8.3 
Austria  44.8 28.7 3.8 3 
Ireland  47.2 22.2 0 5.7 
UK  55.1 44.2 5.2 7.5 
 
Notes. 
 
1. Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey, 1996. 
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Figure 1 
Unemployment Rates by Gender Over Time 
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Source: OECD.  Figures relate to population of working age.  
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Figure 2 
The Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates and Reservation Wage/Wage Ratios 
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Notes. 
1. The gender gaps in unemployment rates come from the coefficient on a female 
dummy in a probit regression for being unemployed where personal characteristics are 
included as controls (this is column B of Table 2).  The gender wage gaps come from 
a similar regression where the dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage and 
the gender gap in reservation wages from a similar regression where the dependent 
variable is the log of the hourly reservation wage. 
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Figure 3 
The Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates and in Wages 
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Notes 
1. Data sources as for Figure 3. 
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Figure 4 
Prejudice and the Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates 
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Notes. 
1. The vertical axis is the average of the gap between female and male 
unemployment rates over the period 1996-2000 inclusive. 
2. The horizontal axis is the fraction agreeing with the statement “when jobs are 
scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”. 
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Data Appendix, Table A1: descriptive statistics 
Spain Greece Italy 
Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Personal Characteristics                         
Age (15-24) 0.11 0.13 0.28 0.33 0.08 0.11 0.32 0.39 0.08 0.10 0.40 0.42 
Age (25-34) 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.37 0.26 0.28 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.32 0.38 0.39 
Age (35-44) 0.28 0.28 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.30 0.12 0.18 0.28 0.29 0.10 0.13 
Age (45-54) 0.22 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.25 0.22 0.13 0.09 0.25 0.23 0.07 0.04 
Age (50-64) 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.01 
High Education 0.23 0.33 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.14 0.22 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.08 
Medium Education 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.23 0.31 0.29 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.48 0.35 0.48 
Low Education 0.58 0.46 0.71 0.57 0.48 0.44 0.45 0.36 0.52 0.40 0.61 0.44 
Married 0.68 0.55 0.37 0.33 0.73 0.69 0.29 0.34 0.70 0.65 0.20 0.22 
Single 0.29 0.33 0.49 0.43 0.25 0.21 0.52 0.40 0.27 0.27 0.65 0.58 
Other Marital Status 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.25 0.02 0.10 0.19 0.26 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.21 
Kids (0-12) 0.26 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.27 0.20 0.04 0.07 0.26 0.21 0.06 0.07 
Kids (13-15) 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.03 
No Kid 0.66 0.76 0.86 0.87 0.64 0.73 0.94 0.89 0.65 0.72 0.91 0.90 
Job Characteristics                         
Full-Time 0.97 0.86     0.97 0.89     0.97 0.86     
Part-Time 0.03 0.14     0.03 0.11     0.03 0.14     
Permanent Contract 0.62 0.59     0.84 0.75     0.85 0.84     
Temporary Contract 0.29 0.31     0.08 0.09     0.07 0.09     
Other Contract 0.09 0.11     0.09 0.16     0.07 0.07     
Private Sector 0.83 0.75     0.79 0.76     0.75 0.66     
Public Sector 0.17 0.25     0.21 0.24     0.25 0.34     
Job Tenure 6.65 6.64     7.71 7.43     7.49 7.49     
Work History                         
Worked Before     0.85 0.73     0.73 0.62     0.42 0.35 
Not Worked Before     0.15 0.27     0.27 0.38     0.58 0.65 
Years Since Last Job     4.07 4.43     3.90 4.66     5.09 4.99 
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France Belgium Netherlands 
Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Personal Characteristics                         
Age (15-24) 0.07 0.07 0.24 0.22 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.04 
Age (25-34) 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.27 0.34 0.21 0.30 0.25 0.34 0.17 0.24 
Age (35-44) 0.30 0.32 0.19 0.21 0.36 0.35 0.24 0.30 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.41 
Age (45-54) 0.28 0.27 0.16 0.15 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.17 0.26 0.21 0.32 0.24 
Age (50-64) 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.06 
High Education 0.24 0.30 0.16 0.18 0.39 0.50 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.10 
Medium Education 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.32 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.43 
Low Education 0.35 0.33 0.50 0.47 0.25 0.19 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.45 0.54 0.48 
Married 0.64 0.58 0.20 0.25 0.70 0.62 0.22 0.29 0.69 0.53 0.26 0.49 
Single 0.27 0.25 0.30 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.24 0.31 0.17 0.08 
Other Marital Status 0.09 0.17 0.50 0.52 0.11 0.20 0.62 0.59 0.07 0.16 0.57 0.43 
Kids (0-12) 0.31 0.27 0.07 0.11 0.28 0.27 0.05 0.13 0.29 0.19 0.04 0.19 
Kids (13-15) 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.06 
No Kid 0.61 0.66 0.91 0.86 0.66 0.66 0.94 0.84 0.61 0.73 0.95 0.75 
Job Characteristics                         
Full-Time 0.97 0.82     0.98 0.76     0.96 0.56     
Part-Time 0.03 0.18     0.02 0.24     0.04 0.44     
Permanent Contract 0.88 0.84     0.92 0.86     0.92 0.86     
Temporary Contract 0.09 0.10     0.06 0.11     0.03 0.05     
Other Contract 0.03 0.05     0.02 0.02     0.06 0.09     
Private Sector 0.74 0.61     0.71 0.61     0.78 0.66     
Public Sector 0.26 0.39     0.29 0.39     0.22 0.34     
Job Tenure 7.21 7.20     7.38 7.45     7.47 6.82     
Work History                         
Worked Before     0.62 0.62     0.89 0.86     0.91 0.91 
Not Worked Before     0.38 0.38     0.11 0.14     0.09 0.09 
Years Since Last Job     3.79 4.16     5.56 6.35     6.18 8.05 
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Luxembourg Germany Denmark 
Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Personal Characteristics                         
Age (15-24) 0.09 0.16 0.31 0.32 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.12 
Age (25-34) 0.35 0.40 0.32 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.37 
Age (35-44) 0.27 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.23 0.21 
Age (45-54) 0.22 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.16 0.18 
Age (50-64) 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.28 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.12 
High Education 0.21 0.17 0.07 0.10 0.27 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.33 0.38 0.23 0.18 
Medium Education 0.40 0.38 0.26 0.25 0.53 0.57 0.50 0.60 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.40 
Low Education 0.39 0.45 0.66 0.64 0.20 0.24 0.35 0.31 0.21 0.19 0.36 0.42 
Married 0.58 0.40 0.09 0.08 0.67 0.59 0.33 0.33 0.55 0.55 0.15 0.21 
Single 0.35 0.43 0.19 0.08 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.09 0.35 0.27 0.21 0.17 
Other Marital Status 0.07 0.17 0.72 0.84 0.08 0.17 0.50 0.58 0.11 0.18 0.64 0.63 
Kids (0-12) 0.23 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.25 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.27 0.28 0.04 0.10 
Kids (13-15) 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.02 
No Kid 0.72 0.81 0.97 0.98 0.68 0.74 0.93 0.91 0.68 0.66 0.95 0.88 
Job Characteristics                         
Full-Time 1.00 0.94     0.99 0.81     0.97 0.83     
Part-Time 0.00 0.06     0.01 0.19     0.03 0.17     
Permanent Contract 0.95 0.92     0.92 0.90     0.88 0.88     
Temporary Contract 0.05 0.07     0.07 0.08     0.05 0.07     
Other Contract 0.00 0.01     0.02 0.01     0.07 0.05     
Private Sector 0.70 0.71     0.78 0.64     0.74 0.46     
Public Sector 0.30 0.29     0.22 0.36     0.26 0.54     
Job Tenure 6.42 6.20     5.84 5.88     6.54 6.53     
Work History                         
Worked Before     0.80 0.91     0.98 0.97     0.95 0.94 
Not Worked Before     0.20 0.09     0.02 0.03     0.05 0.06 
Years Since Last Job     3.20 2.45     4.76 4.31     3.59 3.81 
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Portugal Finland Sweden 
Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Personal Characteristics                         
Age (15-24) 0.17 0.14 0.33 0.31 0.07 0.06 0.19 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.26 0.23 
Age (25-34) 0.25 0.26 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.31 
Age (35-44) 0.24 0.26 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.31 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.20 0.18 
Age (45-54) 0.21 0.22 0.13 0.15 0.31 0.33 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.17 0.16 
Age (50-64) 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.11 
High Education 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.30 0.42 0.12 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.16 0.15 
Medium Education 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.46 0.36 0.47 0.39 0.50 0.49 0.58 0.56 
Low Education 0.84 0.76 0.87 0.86 0.24 0.21 0.41 0.38 0.21 0.17 0.26 0.29 
Married 0.69 0.67 0.28 0.37 0.64 0.67 0.25 0.32 0.46 0.48 0.14 0.17 
Single 0.28 0.21 0.36 0.21 0.27 0.19 0.31 0.16 0.40 0.32 0.39 0.25 
Other Marital Status 0.04 0.11 0.36 0.42 0.09 0.14 0.44 0.52 0.14 0.21 0.47 0.58 
Kids (0-12) 0.29 0.26 0.04 0.09 0.36 0.35 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.33 0.24 0.36 
Kids (13-15) 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.11 
No Kid 0.62 0.66 0.94 0.88 0.54 0.55 0.68 0.62 0.51 0.50 0.66 0.53 
Job Characteristics                         
Full-Time 0.98 0.91     0.96 0.91     0.95 0.81     
Part-Time 0.02 0.09     0.04 0.09     0.05 0.19     
Permanent Contract 0.87 0.83     0.89 0.83     0.87 0.82     
Temporary Contract 0.10 0.14     0.10 0.16     0.08 0.10     
Other Contract 0.03 0.03     0.01 0.01     0.05 0.08     
Private Sector 0.83 0.75     0.77 0.54     0.77 0.46     
Public Sector 0.17 0.25     0.23 0.46     0.23 0.54     
Job Tenure 7.58 7.52                     
Work History                         
Worked Before     0.83 0.79     0.95 0.97         
Not Worked Before     0.17 0.21     0.05 0.03         
Years Since Last Job     4.13 4.74                 
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Austria Ireland UK 
Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed Employed Unemployed 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Personal Characteristics                         
Age (15-24) 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.53 0.13 0.15 0.27 0.32 
Age (25-34) 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.31 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.23 
Age (35-44) 0.27 0.28 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.10 0.27 0.26 0.18 0.18 
Age (45-54) 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.06 0.22 0.24 0.17 0.19 
Age (50-64) 0.09 0.05 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.08 
High Education 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.19 0.25 0.05 0.11 0.44 0.40 0.24 0.28 
Medium Education 0.74 0.64 0.66 0.53 0.39 0.50 0.24 0.41 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 
Low Education 0.19 0.27 0.29 0.42 0.42 0.25 0.71 0.48 0.36 0.40 0.56 0.55 
Married 0.59 0.55 0.25 0.14 0.62 0.53 0.44 0.09 0.59 0.54 0.19 0.06 
Single 0.35 0.32 0.21 0.13 0.36 0.38 0.44 0.40 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.09 
Other Marital Status 0.06 0.13 0.54 0.73 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.52 0.11 0.20 0.59 0.85 
Kids (0-12) 0.38 0.37 0.28 0.36 0.29 0.23 0.12 0.03 0.23 0.19 0.05 0.02 
Kids (13-15) 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01 
No Kid 0.54 0.53 0.68 0.55 0.61 0.69 0.85 0.96 0.72 0.75 0.94 0.97 
Job Characteristics                         
Full-Time 0.99 0.80     0.95 0.76     0.98 0.85     
Part-Time 0.01 0.20     0.05 0.24     0.02 0.15     
Permanent Contract 0.94 0.91     0.85 0.80     0.92 0.90     
Temporary Contract 0.04 0.06     0.04 0.08     0.04 0.05     
Other Contract 0.02 0.03     0.11 0.12     0.04 0.06     
Private Sector 0.77 0.73     0.77 0.69     0.83 0.68     
Public Sector 0.23 0.27     0.23 0.31     0.17 0.32     
Job Tenure         6.47 5.96     5.89 5.75     
Work History                         
Worked Before     0.96 0.94     0.86 0.74     0.87 0.84 
Not Worked Before     0.04 0.06     0.14 0.26     0.13 0.16 
Years Since Last Job             5.92 3.65     4.21 4.12 
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  USA 
 Employed Unemployed 
 Male Female Male Female 
Personal Characteristics         
Age (15-24) 0.10 0.10 0.28 0.25 
Age (25-34) 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.27 
Age (35-44) 0.30 0.30 0.23 0.26 
Age (45-54) 0.24 0.25 0.17 0.16 
Age (50-64) 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.06 
High Educ 0.12 0.08 0.28 0.25 
Medium Educ 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.37 
Medium2  Educ 0.27 0.31 0.21 0.25 
Low Educ 0.29 0.28 0.13 0.14 
Married 0.65 0.60 0.38 0.41 
Not Married 0.35 0.40 0.62 0.59 
          
Kids  0.19 0.22 0.20 0.24 
No Kid 0.81 0.78 0.80 0.76 
 
Note: There is no information on work history and type of job for the US data as the tables in the paper that use this information do not estimate models for the US. 
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